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Book forum 
Mark Johnson, Hallgjerd Aksnes, Thomas Alexander, Giovanni 
Matteucci, Tone Roald 
On Mark Johnson, The aesthetics of meaning 
and thought. The bodily roots of philosophy, 
science, morality, and art 
Chicago-London, University of Chicago Press, 2018, pp. 304 
Mark Johnson (University of Oregon) 
Précis of the book: The aesthetics of meaning 
When I was a high-school senior in the American Midwest during the late 
1960’s, I met a mentor who changed my life and profoundly influenced 
my identity. Like most teenagers, I was trying to figure out who I was, how 
I should live, and what life was all about. The catalyst for my growth was 
the organist, choir director, and young adult teacher at my Lutheran 
church. He was also head of the Art & Music department of the public 
library. I was dumbfounded to learn that someone could spend four hour-
long Sunday morning classes explaining the nature of faith, and then sev-
eral more hours talking about the nature of love, which, at the time, 
struck me as just about the most important topic imaginable. He told us 
to read John Updike’s Rabbit, Run, and then used that to talk about com-
mitment, lust, and love. He gave me a copy of Thomas Merton’s No man 
is an island, which led me to ponder how “love can be kept only by being 
given away”. He introduced me to Bach’s 2nd Brandenburg Concerto, took 
me to my first foreign film (A man and a woman), taught me to appreciate 
the paintings of Raoul Dufy, showed me Medieval illuminated manu-
scripts, and shared poems he clipped from the New Yorker and other 
magazines – poems that seemed to speak directly to my deepest existen-
tial concerns. New worlds opened before me, worlds that explored mean-
ings I couldn’t quite fathom at that age, even as I sensed their importance 
for my life. 
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Imagine my shock when, as an enthusiastic undergraduate attracted 
to philosophy as a quest for the meaning of life, I took my first course in 
the Philosophy of Art. Instead of explorations of art as a vehicle of pro-
found human meaning, what I encountered were philosophical treat-
ments of taste, the universality of aesthetic judgments, the “aesthetic at-
titude”, aesthetic disinterestedness, and the nature of the concept art. 
These are legitimate topics, but none of them seemed to me to capture 
the way art can reveal possibilities for meaning. In graduate school at the 
University of Chicago, these same issues predominated, approached with 
the tools of conceptual analysis characteristic of analytic philosophy. It 
was assumed that there were distinctly “aesthetic” types of experiences 
(as contrasted with those which were moral, political, scientific, religious, 
etc.), and such experiences were taken to be the basis for distinctly aes-
thetic judgments. The analytic aesthetics of the day was more interested 
in the concept of art than the experience of art. Aesthetics had been rel-
egated to the margins of a philosophy concerned mostly with the origins, 
nature, and cognitive status of concepts, reasoning, and knowledge. Aes-
thetics was taken to be subjective, based primarily on feelings and emo-
tions, which supposedly made it unfit as a bearer of meaning and truth. A 
cottage industry arose among aestheticians who tried to defend their 
sense of the importance of art by shoe-horning aesthetics into some cor-
ner of cognitive philosophy, in order to validate its worth as a cognitive 
process. Mostly, they failed. 
My dissertation advisor, Ted Cohen, intuitively understood the key 
role of the arts in a meaningful human life, but he came at this topic 
somewhat constrained by contemporary analytic approaches concerned 
with the cognitive status of the arts. I remain indebted to him for his wise 
and probing treatments of literary fictions, music, and jokes, all of which 
he saw as speaking to our human need for meaning, understanding, and 
wisdom. However, it was not until I got my first job teaching philosophy 
that I found a way to break somewhat free of the constraints and blinders 
of mainstream analytic philosophy of art and aesthetic experience. The 
revelation came in a seminar on Dewey taught by my colleague Tom Al-
exander, focusing mostly on Experience and nature, but ranging widely 
over other seminal works. There, for the first time, I came to appreciate 
Dewey’s insight that philosophy was the search for meaning, and that this 
quest had to start from, and transform, experience in its most aestheti-
cally rich sense. 
Around that time, I had another major intellectual revelation while I 
was co-authoring the book Metaphors we live by (1980) with the distin-
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guished linguist George Lakoff. George introduced me to need for an em-
pirically responsible, scientifically supported approach to meaning, cog-
nition, and language. With the emergence of the field of cognitive science 
in the 1970’s, that meant that an appropriate philosophic account of 
mind, thought, and language had to develop hand in hand with the newly 
emerging sciences of mind. Up through the 1960’s, cognitive science was 
mostly a formal language enterprise grounded in computer science, arti-
ficial intelligence, Chomskyan generative grammar, information-process-
ing psychology, and analytic philosophy. Thought was taken to be a series 
of formal operations performed on meaningless symbols (e.g., a com-
puter language), and so there was no mention of any role for emotions, 
feelings, qualities, or anything one might regard as aesthetic dimensions. 
Things changed dramatically in the 1970’s with the emergence of a 
new second-generation cognitive science that took seriously the bodily 
basis of meaning and thought (known as Embodied Cognition Theory) and 
drew on the rapidly developing sciences of mind. Thought was no longer 
regarded as formal manipulations of intrinsically meaningless symbols, 
and came to be seen as profoundly rooted in our bodily makeup and our 
visceral engagement with other people and our world. Instead of formal 
language models that had little to do with how humans actually think, 
there was a dawning awareness that all our meaning, thought, values, 
and actions were the result of the specific nature of our human brains, 
operating a distinctive human body – a body interacting continuously 
with physical, interpersonal, and cultural environments. This new, sec-
ond-generation approach to mind is what I call embodied cognitive sci-
ence. It took its resources from cognitive linguistics, evolutionary theory, 
developmental psychology, computational neural modeling, phenome-
nology, and embodied cognition theory. 
Now, you might think that aesthetics has always appreciated the role 
of the body. If aesthetics is based on feelings and emotions, and these are 
perturbations of our bodies, then obviously aesthetics recognizes embod-
iment. The problem, however, is that the received view tends to see this 
embodiment as a problem, rather than as the key to an understanding of 
meaning-making. Art and aesthetic experience were seen as problematic 
precisely because they depend so much on our embodiment. If you as-
sume a mind-body split, and you take the challenge of a philosophy of art 
to be explaining how a subjective, feeling-based judgment can have some 
sort of cognitive status, where the cognitive is thought of as a product of 
conceptualization and reasoning, then you will see our embodiment as 
something to be overcome, rather than cherished. It was this “problem” 
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of how feeling-based judgments of taste could nevertheless claim univer-
sally validity that occupied the first half of Kant’s celebrated Critique of 
judgment. 
Taking the body seriously – as the locus of everything we experience 
and do – changes everything. Instead of being banished to the wilderness 
of subjective (and non-cognitive) feelings, aesthetics becomes the source 
for all our experience, meaning, thought, values, and actions. You come 
to appreciate Dewey’s founding claim that organism-environment trans-
actions, which he called “experience”, are the origin of all the meaning 
and values we have, and shape the nature of our conceptualization and 
reasoning. The sensing, desiring, acting animate body becomes the locus 
of who we are and can become. Mind is in the body, and the body per-
meates mind. 
What does it mean to adopt a body-based aesthetics of life processes? 
It means that what we are, what we can experience, how we experience 
anything, and what we can become are all rooted in and shaped by our 
animal nature. Our brains and bodies are the result of evolutionary pro-
cesses that establish our current shared neural (and bodily) architecture, 
which is then fine-tuned by our developmental experiences over the 
course of our lives. Mind and meaning-making are always in process – 
emergent functions rooted in our capacities for perception, bodily move-
ment, and feeling. To capture the appropriate levels of emergent func-
tional organization requires multiple methods and forms of explanation. 
Therefore, to understand mind, thought, and action, you need a plural-
istic understanding of how perception works, where our values come 
from, how consciousness emerges, what role feelings play in thinking and 
knowing, how actions are generated, how shared meanings are possible, 
and what art is and does, to name just a few emergent processes. You 
need a pragmatist embodied aesthetics. 
In my own work, that has meant always starting my investigations by 
examining how experience arises from, and is continuously transformed 
by, our perceptual, motor, and affective interface with our environment. 
That interface is not merely sensory-motor interactions. It also includes 
the working of emotions and feelings, as well as our social transactions 
with other people. It is our social engagement that makes possible our 
higher-order shared systems of meaning and value. There are multiple 
dimensions of this experience-based approach. One component is the re-
current, intrinsically meaningful patterns that emerge, non-reflectively, 
from our ongoing bodily engagement with our surroundings. Given our 
evolved functional (perceptual and motor) capacities, our bodily consti-
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tution and size, and the nature of the environments we routinely inhabit, 
our surroundings will offer recurring affordances (to use J.J. Gibson’s apt 
term) for experiences we have had, are now having, or might have in the 
future. In separate books published in 1987, George Lakoff and I named 
these affordance patterns image schemas. They include spatial relations 
schemas (e.g., up/down, above/below, front/back, center/periphery, 
near/far), object manipulation schemas (e.g., object, grasp, throw, lift, 
push, pull, catch, punch, kick, etc.), action, or bodily movement, schemas 
(e.g., walk, run, trot, prance, locomotion, source-path-goal, etc.), and 
schemas involving qualitative and quantitative change (e.g., scalar inten-
sity schemas such as more/less, hot/cold, wet/dry, crescendo/decrescen-
do, etc.). You can divide these schemas into various types, if this serves 
some explanatory purpose, but they are all recurring patterns of our 
body-environment interactions that operate automatically and mostly 
beneath the level of consciousness, to structure our meaningful experi-
ence. And they are all primitive aesthetic components of our lived expe-
rience, stemming from the nature of our bodies and their surroundings. 
Another second source of meaning is our evolved capacities for emo-
tions and feelings. In contrast with intellectualist approaches that deny 
such feeling states any cognitive validity, neuropsychological research re-
veals the pervasive influence of affective processes in all experience – in 
what and how we experience, think about, and act on aspects of our 
world. Emotions developed in animals as mechanisms for maintaining the 
homeostatic processes necessary for survival and enhanced quality of life. 
Emotions are thus patterns of bodily response arising from changes in 
bodily states resulting from interactions with our surroundings. These 
bodily responses (in breathing, muscular tone and readiness, hormone 
secretions, energy maintenance) are geared toward our well-being and 
well-doing. On some occasions, we actually feel these changes in our bod-
ily states in the form of pain, pleasure, energy, lethargy, attentiveness, 
distraction, elation, anxiety, and so forth. Emotions and feelings are thus 
primordial processes for preserving and recovering the dynamic equilib-
rium of our organic selves necessary for survival and flourishing. That is 
why emotions and feelings can be profoundly meaningful. Felt emotions 
alert us to the meaning of what is happening to us. 
A third critical aesthetic component is the qualitative character of ex-
perience. This includes the more obvious perceived visual, tactile, olfac-
tory, gustatory, and auditory qualities that make our experience mean-
ingful and attract our attention and energy. What is the meaning of the 
red of a strawberry, the fading sunlight on an early winter’s day, the 
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sound of wind through the trees, the taste of a ripe peach, or the smell of 
baking bread? An adequate aesthetics of everyday life would need to ex-
plore how these qualities, arising in various perceptual modalities, are 
meaningful to us. But, beyond these particular qualities, there is also what 
Dewey called the qualitative unity of a whole situation. Dewey described 
this phenomenologically as the felt unifying sense of a situation as mean-
ingful. Today we have detailed neuroscience accounts of how this quali-
tative process underlies our more conscious cognitive acts of conceptu-
alization and reasoning. In perception, for example, there are cortico-lim-
bic pathways that generate a holistic, diffuse, and affect-rich sense of spa-
tial and temporal context. It is this processing pathway that underlies 
Dewey’s notion of a pervasive qualitative unity of a situation. Then, rela-
tive to this sense of one’s situation, there is a different neural pathway 
that generates a more focused anxious attentiveness to an object located 
within that context. So, objects of focal awareness arise from a qualitative 
contextual background that situates and gives significance to those ob-
jects. The point, as Dewey presciently recognized, is that we are first in a 
qualitatively unified situation, within which we then select objects for at-
tention and projected action. This felt sense of a meaningful experience 
is the basis for all subsequent aesthetic discriminations. 
These three briefly described components are representative, but far 
from exhaustive, of the aesthetic dimensions shared by nearly all people, 
by virtue of their biological and social make-up. All three of these dimen-
sions, rooted in our bodies and brains, provide shared aesthetic sensibili-
ties that have led many philosophers of art to claim universal validity for 
aesthetic judgments, and to claim that great works of painting, music, 
dance, literature, architecture, and film speak a universal language of 
feelings and emotions – a shared aesthetic sensibility.  
Any naturalistic account of aesthetic dimensions of experience is thus 
faced with the fundamental question of how mostly unconscious bodily 
processes involving image schemas, feelings, emotions, and qualities can 
be the basis of celebrated works of art. The answer is that, from an evo-
lutionary and developmental perspective, the higher capacities, func-
tions, and modes of meaning-making operate through recruitment of or-
dinary structures, capacities, and processes common to all experiences. 
These higher emergent levels of functional organization make possible 
new insights, meanings, and values, but they are all rooted in, and are 
continuous with, our primordial sensory, motor, and affective processes. 
The aesthetics of everyday bodily existence can sometimes move, thrill, 
or sadden us in our daily lives, but in species with language and other 
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forms of symbolic communication, meaning becomes expanded, deep-
ened, and enhanced, giving rise to intensified and enriched significance. 
This gives us our sense that great artworks are purveyors of complex, 
emotionally-charged, universal meanings. 
One of Dewey’s central claims was that what we call works of art are 
simply exemplary cases of enhanced experience – harmonized, intensi-
fied, and enriched experiences resulting from the same aesthetic dimen-
sions that make up any ordinary meaningful experience. The arts are 
heightened experiences that reveal the rich possibilities for meaning 
available to us. They invite us to inhabit the world realized in the artwork. 
According to this perspective, we value the arts because they are ex-
emplary modes of experience, opening up possible meanings that suggest 
new ways of living and being. Although there are representational aspects 
of various arts, art is not necessarily representational. It is not principally 
a matter of re-presenting something previously experienced or some-
thing outside the artwork. Arts do not re-present meanings. Rather, they 
enact meanings, both actual and potential. They reveal worlds we can in-
habit, and show us ways we can dwell in and experience them meaning-
fully. In so doing, they transform who we are and how we reach out to 
the world. 
My project, then, in The aesthetics of meaning and thought, is to ex-
plore the bodily basis of our aesthetic sensibilities, and then to indicate 
some of the many ways that all our cognitive achievements, not just those 
in the arts, are possible only insofar as they are grounded in the aesthetic 
dimensions of common experience. An aesthetics of meaning is just as 
central for science, philosophy, morality, and law, as it is in the arts. 
Hallgjerd Aksnes (University of Oslo)  
Making sense 
Mark Johnson’s latest book, The aesthetics of meaning and thought: the 
bodily roots of philosophy, science, morality, and art (2018 [= AMT]) is a 
new milestone in Johnson’s unremitting quest to elucidate the ways in 
which meaning becomes meaningful to us. The book is so rich and many-
faceted that it is impossible to do full justice to it within the limits of this 
short contribution to the book symposium. Thus, I have chosen to con-
centrate on perspectives from the book that are especially relevant to my 
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own work as a musicologist, where Mark Johnson’s philosophy has played 
a central role in my understanding of musical meaning.  
A major tenet of Johnson’s philosophy is that all meaning is embodied, 
whether we are dealing with meaning as it emerges in everyday life 
(Lakoff, Johnson 1980) or meaning and thought in philosophy, science, 
morality, and art. Lakoff and Johnson’s analysis of conceptual metaphors 
– “in terms of which we both think and act” – (1980: 3) was a seminal 
contribution to the emerging field of cognitive semantics. Mark Johnson 
has not been content just to analyze the workings of the conceptual sys-
tem, however; The aesthetics of meaning and thought has taken on the 
colossal philosophical project of accounting for the implications our em-
bodiment has for “all the processes by which we enact meaning through 
perception, bodily movement, feeling, and imagination” (AMT: 2). Follow-
ing John Dewey’s Art as experience (1934), Johnson subsumes these pro-
cesses under the term aesthetic experience, adding that “all meaningful 
experience is aesthetic experience”. His application of Varela, Thompson, 
Rosch’s notion of enaction (see Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991) to the 
problem of meaning, is in my view one of Johnson’s most important con-
tributions to philosophy, and a central part of his argument in The aes-
thetics of meaning and thought. 
Johnson’s philosophy of experience focuses on “the aesthetics of em-
bodied life” (the title of the introductory chapter), a project that aligns 
not only with pragmatism, but also with central concerns within phenom-
enology, hermeneutics, and existentialism. However, Johnson’s highly in-
terdisciplinary account goes far beyond the reaches of philosophy, as it 
also includes insights from cognitive semantics, cognitive psychology, 
cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and art criticism. 
Johnson places himself within the relatively new field of neuropragma-
tism, which is founded on a number of key shared themes of pragmatism 
and neuroscience, identified as: “organism-environment transaction as 
the locus of activity”, “the continuity of experience”, “antidualism”, “the 
intertwining of reason and emotion”, and “nonreductionism that involves 
multiple levels of explanation” (AMT: 98-108).  
Understanding aesthetics in the broad sense that is advocated in The 
aesthetics of meaning and thought, in every sense of the word sense, 
stands in strong opposition to the dualism inherent in the work of the 
founding father of modern aesthetics, Alexander Baumgarten. He coined 
the term “Ästhetik” in Reflections on poetry from 1735 (from Greek aistha-
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nesthai “perceive [by the senses or by the mind], feel”1) to describe a sci-
ence of sensory perception, as opposed to logic, the science of intellect2. 
Baumgarten’s treatise Aesthetica (1750-1758) established aesthetics as a 
branch of philosophy devoted to art, our sense (feeling) of beauty, and 
taste; an understanding of aesthetics that is prevalent still today, at least 
within Anglo-American philosophy3. Johnson argues that the separation 
between sensory perception and thought (or intellect), feeling and rea-
son that is a legacy of Enlightenment philosophy, has led to a marginali-
zation of aesthetics, and a disengagement of art from life, as discussed by 
Dewey in Art as experience (AMT: 13). Johnson’s antidualist alternative 
recognizes perception, feeling, thought, and reason as inextricably inter-
twined aspects of our “deep visceral, emotional, and qualitative relation 
to our world” (AMT: 1), which underlies not only artistic experience but 
all thought. 
The aesthetics of meaning and thought consists of three parts. Part I, 
“Philosophy and science”, focuses not only on the aesthetics but also the 
metaphoricity of meaning and thought in philosophy and science. Chap-
ter 2, titled “Philosophy’s debt to metaphor”, draws both upon the influ-
ential cognitive metaphor theory Johnson developed together with 
George Lakoff, and upon Johnson’s comprehensive (45 pages) introduc-
tory chapter titled “Metaphor in the philosophical tradition” in Johnson 
(1981), which demonstrates the historical depth and contextual breadth 
of his horizon from the very beginning of his production.  
Part II of The aesthetics of meaning and thought, titled “Morality and 
law” argues against what Johnson calls “the moral law folk theory” found-
ed on Kant’s rationalist moral philosophy, which views morality as “pure-
ly” rule-governed. Johnson transcends the dichotomy between reason 
and feeling that underlies Kant’s philosophy, and argues that morality 
should instead be regarded “as a system of rationally derived moral laws 
and moral deliberation as a process of imaginative projection” (AMT: 163; 
emphasis added). According to Johnson, the quality of our moral thinking 
depends on much more than a knowledge of rules; it is dependent on “(1) 
the depth and breadth of our knowledge of the physical and social worlds 
we inhabit, (2) our understanding of human motivation and cognitive/af-
fective development, (3) our perceptiveness of which factors are most 
 
1 Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com/word/aesthetic?ref=et-
ymonline_crossreference 
2 See Walton et al., https://www-oxfordartonline-com.  
3 See Scruton, Munro, https://www.britannica.com/topic/aesthetics 
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relevant in a particular situation, and (4) our ability to simulate the expe-
riences and responses of other people with whom we are interacting4. It 
is thus as much an affair of imagination as it is an appropriation of prior 
knowledge” (AMT: 171). 
And now, finally, we have come to my favorite part of the book, Part 
III, “Art and the aesthetics of life”, which is both about art and about what 
Johnson calls “Dewey’s big idea for aesthetics” (the title of chapter 10), 
defined by Johnson as: “Every relatively meaningful and fulfilled experi-
ence is individuated by a pervasive unifying quality” (AMT: 226). Johnson 
points out three convictions underlying Dewey’s philosophical orienta-
tion: “(1) Philosophy should begin and end with experience, taken in the 
richest, deepest sense; (2) aesthetic dimensions are what constitute the 
character of any fully developed and meaningful experience; and (3) at-
tention to the qualitative aspects of experience is the key to an under-
standing of human mind, thought, language, and value” (AMT: 225-6). 
This brings Johnson to the conclusion that “the test of a philosophy is its 
ability to deepen, expand, enrich, and liberate our experience, and this 
requires that we begin and end our philosophical inquiries in the qualita-
tive depths of experience” (loc. cit.). 
But where, then, does art come in? Johnson appropriates Dewey’s 
view of fulfilled experience as “art in germ”, regarding art as “experience 
in its consummatory, eminent sense” (AMT: 232). He continues: “Art re-
veals, through immediate presentation of qualities unified in a compre-
hensive whole, the meaning and significance of some aspect of our world, 
either as it was, is, or might be. At its best, art shows us the meaningful 
possibilities of our world”5 (loc. cit.). Johnson does not only discuss art in 
general, however, but also specific literary, musical, and visual artworks, 
and the meanings he enacts in these interpretations – sensitive sensings, 
in every sense of the word sense – is for me among the ultimate highlights 
of The aesthetics of meaning and thought. I will now make a short digres-
sion into music therapy in order to argue for my view that Mark Johnson 
is not only an eminent philosopher, but also an artist. In a recent article 
(see Aksnes 2017) I have applied perspectives from pragmatism and John-
son’s philosophy to a discussion of my Norwegian colleague Even Ruud’s 
 
4 On AMT: 166 Johnson characterizes this ability as empathetic imagination. 
5 Dewey’s insight that the work of art “presents the world in a new experience”, is one 
of many interesting parallels between Dewey and hermeneutic philosophers like Mar-
tin Heidegger (1936) and Paul Ricœur (1975; 1983). Incidentally, Ricœur was Mark 
Johnson’s doctoral advisor together with Ted Cohen at the University of Chicago. 
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notion of “acting together” (“samhandling”) in music therapy. Here I ar-
gue that so-called receptive music therapy (i.e. music therapy that takes 
music listening as its point of departure) is not at all passively receptive, 
as is implied when we use the term “reception” for the appropriation of 
artworks’ meanings; but rather “actively acting” (“aktivt handlende”), as 
we say in Norwegian – or enactive, as I will say from now on, following 
Johnson. In this light, enacting meaning through the “reception” of an 
artwork is not only receptive, but also constitutive – we create art when 
we enact meaning in and through art, adding our own meanings, and thus 
contributing to the artworks’ play of meaning and history of effect, as 
Gadamer (1960) notes. 
In chapter 9, “Identity, bodily meaning, and art”, Johnson writes about 
embodied schemas and feeling contours in music, discussing the philoso-
pher Susanne Langer and her description of music as the “tonal analogue 
of emotive life” (Langer 1953: 27). He also refers to the developmental 
psychologist Daniel Stern’s notion of vitality affects (see Stern 1985); 
basic, amodal activation contours, which as both Stern and Johnson note, 
“are most evident in temporal arts, such as music and dance, in which 
there is some kind of actual or virtual movement” (AMT: 219). Other ref-
erences in Johnson’s account of embodied schemas and feeling contours 
in music, are in Johnson, Larson (2003) as well a list of other musical met-
aphor theorists who have applied cognitive metaphor theory to their 
work: Lawrence Zbikowski, Janna Saslaw, Michael Spitzer, Juha Ojala, Ar-
nie Cox, and myself. I find that he is mistaken, however, when he states 
that we have given “much more profound and sophisticated treatments 
of embodied musical meaning” than himself (AMT: 220). Johnson’s beau-
tifully sensitive sensings of Somewhere over the rainbow (2007), and not 
least Singin’ in the rain in the introductory chapter of The aesthetics of 
meaning and thought (see AMT: 23-4), are to me among the very most 
profound and sophisticated enactments of embodied musical meaning 
because they demonstrate so fully the felt sense, pervasive qualitative 
unity, emotions and feelings, embodied schemas and feeling contours of 
musical experience – all of the embodied dimensions of experience that 
Johnson lists in “Identity, bodily meaning, and art” (AMT: 211).  
 What is it about Singin’ in the rain that is so moving? Johnson dis-
cusses how art “presents or enacts the very patterning of our waxing and 
waning feelings as they change in quality, force, directedness, or manner 
of movement. Music famously accomplishes this latter task, because mu-
sical experience is a form of metaphorical motion” (AMT: 23). He draws 
upon the work of the phenomenologist of dance Maxine Sheets-John-
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stone (see Sheets-Johnstone 1999), remarking: “Put music and dance to-
gether in a musical, and you have a powerful visceral enactment of the 
complex and nuanced emotional dimensions of meaning” (loc. cit.). John-
son then writes with empathetic enthusiasm about Gene Kelly and Deb-
bie Reynolds’ goodnight kiss on the doorstep, Kelly’s big smile, and his 
merrily strolling doo-dloo-doo-doo-ing. He continues: “The arch up from 
‘I’m’ to ‘si-i-ing’ is a felt rush of positive emotional tension – a surging up 
of sheer joy – mirrored in his floating walk, his upturned face, and his 
open posture. […] The effect is the felt swelling of positive feeling gushing 
up and dropping down slightly as it pours out” (AMT: 24). What beautiful 
poetry! As a musicologist specializing in the impossible task of describing 
music in words, I feel compelled to add: …and the sweet orchestral har-
monies, the yearning effect of the long dominant stretch and drawn out6 
cadence accompanying the two loved ones’ final kiss – a harmonic incor-
poration of the ATTRACTION schema. Not to mention Kelly’s infatuated 
echolalia, where Reynolds’ “California dew” is transformed into a repeti-
tive, rhythmically entraining “doo-dloo-doo-doing…” (Not very surpris-
ingly, when we are in love, the same areas of the brain light up as in OCD.) 
And the orchestra’s swelling crescendo7 – nothing but a heart in love can 
surge8 like the swelling crescendo of an orchestra! As well as the perfect 
synchrony between Kelly’s elated movements – his playful strumming on 
the umbrella, tap dancing, swirling, leaping, bounding, skipping up and 
down the sidewalks, silly swooshing and splashing with his feet – and the 
sounding music; the man and the music mirroring each other perfectly… 
Such a perfect exemplification of the psychologist Charlotte Wolff’s de-
scription of elation in Wolff (1945): “Elation is shown by a wealth of un-
necessary movement, fast motor speeds, exhibitionist behaviour, spon-
taneous, emphatic and rhythmical gesture and self-assertiveness”.  
We could go on forever, the experience of Singin’ in the rain being so 
rich, heterogeneous and multi-faceted that describing it is an “infinite 
task” (as Edmund Husserl admitted towards the end of his life). The point 
is not to replicate the magnificently multimodal experience of Singin’ in 
the rain. This would be a futile task, anyway, as many aspects of this ex-
perience are sensory, and thus not accessible to language – words can 
never completely capture the richness of the felt sense of our experien-
ces. However, philosophers and art critics can describe aspects of artistic 
 
6 “Drawn out” is one of the vitality affects Stern lists in Stern 1985: 54. 
7 Also on Stern’s list (loc. cit.) 
8 Also on Stern’s list (loc. cit.) 
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experience. For instance, we have all felt the rush of joy of being in love 
(our hearts leaping with joy, analogous to Gene Kelly’s octave-leaping 
“I’m si-i-ing”); we have expressed love and joy through rushes of move-
ment and playfully skipping steps, not least during childhood; and we em-
pathetically and imaginatively identify both with the emotional expres-
sions of other people (Gene Kelly’s happy smile, happy voice, and elated 
movements), as well as with perceived emotions “in” the music. Musical 
joy, like a smiling face, happy voice, and silly swooshing splash, is conta-
gious – even more contagious than the Coronavirus! That is why people 
are rushing to their balconies all over the world to play with, and for, each 
other these days; to share empathetic humanity and contagious musical 
joy during the Coronavirus crisis. Thank you, Italy, birthplace of opera, for 
this splendid idea! 
Music, which “presents or enacts the very patterning of our waxing 
and waning feelings as they change in quality, force, directedness, or 
manner of movement”, is especially apt for affect attunement and health 
promotion, whether it is enacted within a therapeutic context or as men-
tal hygiene out on the balconies. The etymology of health, “whole”, hints 
at the existential promise that lies in paying more heed to the important 
aesthetic dimensions of meaning and thought, which integrate our body-
minds. This can also explain the great popularity of techniques like mind-
fulness and yoga in our disembodied Western cultures, where we need 
to relearn to pay attention to the bodies we are taught to ignore. We 
need more than just music, art, mindfulness, and yoga, however – we also 
need Mark Johnson, to tell us why. 
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Thomas Alexander (Southern Illinois University Carbondale) 
Mark Johnson’s aesthetic revolution in philosophy 
Alfred North Whitehead notes that one of the fundamental tasks of phi-
losophy is to reveal the “tacit presuppositions” permeating the thought 
of an era (see, for example, Whitehead 1929: III, 67). He goes on to note 
that because they are tacit in no way diminishes their influence. On the 
contrary, they often are highly determinative of the salient and conscious 
concepts of a given worldview. A philosophy that can reveal some of 
these submerged features is therefore extremely valuable for doing just 
that. If it happens to offer a deeper, truer, and more wholesome ap-
proach to the central concerns of life – let us just say “wisdom” – it is 
more valuable by far. Such, I believe, is the legacy of the body of work 
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Mark Johnson has accomplished. His work not only reveals operative in-
herited assumptions in Anglophone philosophy, but effectively calls them 
into question while offering an alternative path, a via imaginativa, worthy 
for future philosophical inquiry. I wish here to examine the implications 
of “aesthetics” as Johnson conceives it for the exploration of cultural self-
understanding, an aesthetics of existence. Specifically, I wish to extend 
Johnson’s idea of imagination and metaphor in the genesis of cultural 
symbols, especially those core cultural themes that function in constitut-
ing a “world”. Such tropes and symbols that lie at the core of cultural 
webs are articulated as “mythoi”, accounts that reveal important mean-
ings and values in that world1. Thus, my aim here is to point out an appli-
cation of Johnson’s philosophy of embodiment toward an “aesthetics” of 
culture.  
Johnson’s work began with a focus on the neglected subject of meta-
phor, not only defending it as a form of rational meaning but as offering 
insight into the ways in which the living body and its various structures 
shapes the very intelligibility of our understanding of the world. Though 
beginning as a reconstruction of Kant, the project was significantly recast 
with Johnson’s “Deweyan turn”. This would eventually lead toward a 
more ecological theory of experience and meaning, where the dualism of 
subject and object was overcome for an interactive involvement between 
living human beings and the world. The topic of imagination, the recon-
struction of Kant, and the turn toward a more robust ecological view of 
experience led him to discern the tacit presuppositions that had domi-
nated modern philosophy, variously described as “Objectivism”, “the En-
lightenment view”, and the “Folk theory”. In other words, Johnson’s pro-
ject began with a direct challenge to the presuppositions of the Enlight-
enment’s views of reason, imagination, mind, body, concept, meaning, 
and feeling. This is clear in the very first bold lines of The body in the mind: 
Without imagination, nothing in the world could be meaningful. Without imagi-
nation, we could never make sense of our experience. Without imagination, we 
could never reason toward knowledge of reality. (Johnson 1987: ix) 
This flies in the face of the view, which Johnson sums up in that inau-
gural book under the term “Objectivism”, the assumption that the world 
 
1 Since the term “myth” now inevitably refers to false stories, I have designated the 
term “mythos” to stand for any important story or narrative structure that reveals a 
key aspect of the identity or a person, group, or world. 
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is a totality of “objects” awaiting description in propositional form2. The 
truth of this world of objects, i.e., “facts”, is a literal truth that is capable 
of purely formal expression. “Reason” here is not grounded in human em-
bodiment, but aspires to a God’s eye view, the world as a system of facts. 
Objects have properties and relations; concepts refer to such entities; 
categories give an overview or meta-description of these concepts. The 
purpose of philosophy since the advent of the modern period has been 
understood as the quest for knowledge. The “problem of knowledge” has 
been considered as the central concern, and philosophy is understood to 
be in partnership with the sciences as “grounding” or “clarifying” them3. 
Philosophy is epistemology. This is perhaps one of the most pervasive, 
unquestioned tacit presuppositions in contemporary Anglophone 
thought. A review of the specializations of faculty in philosophy depart-
ments in the Anglophone world drives this truth home. Those who do 
question it are dismissed as “not philosophers”.  
What happens when imagination is put at the heart of human under-
standing? First the meaning of imagination changes. It is not the random, 
inexplicable, arbitrary faculty. This interpretation was the mirror image of 
the Objectivist account of reason4. Rather, Johnson proposed, imagina-
tion is the way human beings mean, the way we engage a qualitative, 
moving world in terms of its possibilities, as process, not a completed sys-
tem of facts. We grasp the world in terms of its possibilities, not just its 
actualities. Early on, Johnson focused on what he and linguist George 
Lakoff call “image schemata”5. An image schema, Johnson says “is a re-
curring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor pro-
grams that gives coherence and structure to our experience” (Johnson 
1987: xiv). They are ways experience is organized – not from “behind” the 
phenomena like Kantian categories, but as projections of the human lived 
body as means of making sense of our environment. Metaphor is a key 
way such projections are made. A range of meanings clusters about the 
fact we are upright beings: we crawl and learn to stand and walk; to do 
these we must balance ourselves. Thus we describe someone as an up-
right or balanced person, as fallen or unstable, as coming to “stand on his 
 
2 To be precise, Johnson 1987 was Johnson’s first book as solo author; it had been 
preceded by the co-authored book Johnson, Lakoff 1980. 
3 This assumption, by the way, is a prime example of what I mean by “mythos”. 
4 Richard Rorty can be considered an exemplar of this “ironist” relativism. 
5 This was a term borrowed from Kant’s first and third Critiques and an attempt to give 
some substance to the idea. troubling accounts. See Johnson (156 f.). 
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own two feet”, and so on6. These various patterns do not fit in a “core 
concept”; they radiate in complex and surprising ways7. It is important to 
note that these schemata are so pervasive as often to pass by conscious 
notice. Many defenses of “literalism” are laced with such metaphors un-
wittingly. They are also creative and active in organizing experience, mak-
ing them a primary way we “have a world” at all8.  
In Kuhnian fashion, The body in the mind, by detecting and trying to 
solve an anomaly, led to a general paradigm shift in the conception of 
meaning and so of philosophy. In subsequent books and papers, Johnson 
made his “Deweyan turn”. The aesthetics of meaning and thought is the 
mature fruit of this transformation. The struggles to help Kant overcome 
himself are gone and a robust Deweyan naturalism is in place9. In partic-
ular this shift involves (1) a recognition of the role of what Dewey calls 
“the felt pervasive quality” of a situation as providing a determination of 
the discrete, focal and conscious features of experience and (2) a refusal 
to treat the mind, brain, or nervous system as a “thing” on its own, sepa-
rate from the ecological perspective of the whole organism-in-its-envi-
ronment. Johnson is fond of Dewey’s admonition: “To see the organism 
in nature, the nervous system in the organism, the brain in the nervous 
system, the cortex in the brain is the answer to the problems that haunt 
philosophy” (Dewey 1925: 224)10. While the first leads toward a view of 
experience as pervaded by aesthetic quality capable of being intensified 
and made conscious (the task of art), the second leads to a boldly ecolog-
ical and non-reductionistic view of nature. The idea that all experience is 
an instance of “knowing” is given up as is the idea that “naturalism” as-
pires to physics or neurology and not also – maybe more so – to ecology, 
anthropology, and art11.  
Aesthetics, on Johnson’s view, is no longer a neglected corner of the 
project of epistemology, concerned with a special “attitude” or limited to 
the themes of art and beauty and how judgments about them are possi-
ble. It now has central import as dealing with the creation of meaning and 
 
6 See Johnson (71 f.). 
7 See Lakoff 1987, especially chapter 6. 
 8 See Johnson 1987: 98, 171-2. 
9 See Johnson’s final judgment on Kant in Johnson 2018 [= AMT]: 9-10. 
10 For Johnson’s account of the role of quality as a pervasive feature of situations, see 
AMT: 224-41, chapter 10, “Dewey’s big idea for aesthetics”. 
11 The idea that any experience is ultimately an instance of “knowing” is perhaps one 
of the most tenacious “tacit presuppositions” of contemporary philosophy. Dewey had 
rejected it by the late 1890s. 
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value in human existence. “I contend”, says Johnson, “that […] aesthetics 
is not merely a matter of constructing theories of something called aes-
thetic experience, but instead extends broadly to encompass all the pro-
cesses by which we enact meaning through perception, bodily move-
ment, feeling, and imagination” (Johnson 2018 [= AMT]: 2). This is an 
“aesthetics of our bodily, worldly existence” (AMT: 13-4; see: 24-5). Aes-
thetics is an exploration of the way we engage both the actualities and 
possibilities of the world, the “affordances” of the world (AMT: 11)12. 
Johnson’s view of aesthetic meaning, then, is the basis of a general 
theory of meaning, rooted in our bodily existence deep below the cogni-
tive and propositional level. And it becomes most fully realized in con-
scious experiences that are qualitative intensifications of our general ex-
perience13. Johnson has developed the implications of this theory for eth-
ics as well as art. I would like in the space left to connect it with some 
ideas of my own on the philosophy of civilization. I agree with Johnson 
that human beings are makers of meaning. In fact, I believe human exist-
ence has a drive toward the experience of embodied meaning which I 
have termed “the Human Eros”14. Not only do we make meaning but 
when meaning is stripped from our lives, we suffer and even die15. One 
of the functions of culture is to provide the Human Eros with an environ-
ment of experienceable meanings and values, a cosmos, as it were.  
Cultures exist as ways of sustaining the Human Eros, which is why cul-
tural heritages are tended, protected, and passed down. We need to have 
a sense not just of the meaning of the world capable of symbolic articu-
lation and aesthetic encounter but of our identities, who we are, as well. 
This organization of meanings and values into a system I call a “spiritual 
ecology”16. So: the Human Eros seeks to create and sustain spiritual ecol-
ogies, cultural worlds within which we can encounter meanings and val-
ues and have a sense of who we are. All sorts of cultural practices and 
objects contain core cultural meanings that help refresh and strengthen 
the central tropes that define a group or an individual. A trope is like an 
image schemata: it is a structure capable of a variety of forms of embodi-
 
12 The term “affordances” comes from psychologist J.J. Gibson and denotes the specific 
ways animals relate to their environments in terms of coordinating specific actions and 
definite possibilities. See Gibson 1986. 
13 This is Dewey’s famous thesis in Art as experience. See especially chapter 3, “Having 
an experience”. 
14 See the title essay in Alexander 2013.  
15 The basic idea for this comes from Frankl 1986.  
16 See Alexander 2013: chapter 14, “Eros and spirit”. 
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ment within a culture. The tropes of “freedom” or “individualism” in A-
merican culture can be embodied in paintings, movies, ceremonies, legal 
entities (like the Constitution), intellectual works and so on. Tropes func-
tion as ways in which a culture continues to recognize its meaning in the 
world in various embodiments. 
The articulation of a trope, to repeat, is often through “mythos”. A 
mythos is any story (or implicit narrative structure) that conveys a sense 
of identity of self or important features of the world; it is an important 
story which if lost or changed would significantly alter the meaning and 
possibly the value of that which it is about17. We all have central stories 
that concern our core identities: where we are from, our childhood, our 
communities, nationalities and so on. Should any of these core stories be 
modified or lost we ourselves would undergo change. A mythos, then, is 
an important story in the sense it has to do with the articulation of the 
meaning of existence. It involves tropes as schemata that compose the 
central meanings for the identity of an individual, a group, or a culture. 
Mythoi provide the concrete ways of embodied meaning. Insofar as a 
range of tropes may come into play and so have mutual proximity and 
relevance to each other with explicit and implicit mutual implications, 
they need to have these relationships exposed and explored. Thus, many 
cultural works, especially artworks, are concerned with disclosing and try-
ing to resolve these tensions. As the Hebrew idea of God evolved from 
that of a merely powerful being to that of a moral one, it became neces-
sary to explore the problem of evil. This has been a persistent theme in 
western culture from The book of job on.  
Aesthetics, then, in Mark Johnson’s view, is the study of embodied 
meaning. My extension of embodiment aims toward a study of culture, 
especially in terms of central tropes and mythoi. They can reveal “tacit 
presuppositions” that are highly operative if largely unconscious. For four 
hundred years western philosophy has operated its own tropes and my-
thoi focused around the project of science. In believing itself to be “ra-
tional” and “scientific”, philosophy lost touch with its history and the im-
portance of imagination and aesthetic experience. Mark Johnson’s aes-
thetic revolution opens up a way of recovery of these suppressed dimen-
sions of meaning and a creative field for as yet only barely tried adven-
tures in ideas. As Johnson has often said, “the stone that was cast away 
 
17 A mythos need not be linguistic; a temple, dance, musical piece, ceremony, etc. all 
have syntactic structures. 
Book forum. On Mark Johnson, The aesthetics of meaning and thought 
312 
shall be the cornerstone” (AMT: 224; after Matthew 21.42 and Ps. 118, 
22). 
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Giovanni Matteucci (University of Bologna)  
How many experiences for an extended mind? 
My task here is particularly difficult. The ideas laid out by Johnson in The 
aesthetics of meaning and thought (2018 [= AMT]) and some of the ideas 
I have tried to justify also recently (Matteucci 2019) seem to strongly con-
verge. In order to play my role as discussant I must therefore enter into 
technical issues concerning the subtle fine-tuning of the same frame of 
reference. At the same time, I would not want my arguments to be seen 
as completely captious. It seems to me that the overall tonality of the 
shared frame of reference is played out on these details, as when the var-
iation of a single note in a melody succeeds in giving the latter an unex-
pected colour. 
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1. As far as the general project of a philosophical aesthetics is concerned, 
the core of Johnson’s stance can be well summarized by the following 
quotations: 
Aesthetics is not merely a matter of constructing theories of something called 
aesthetic experience, but instead extends broadly to encompass all the processes 
by which we enact meaning through perception, bodily movement, feeling, and 
imagination. In other words, all meaningful experience is aesthetic experience. 
(AMT: 2) 
Aesthetics has been conceived far too narrowly as concerned with something 
called “aesthetic experience”, which is then distinguished from other modes of 
experience and thought (e.g., theoretical, technical, and moral) that make up the 
fabric of our daily lives. (AMT: 225) 
Any adequate theory of meaning will have to focus on those qualitative and af-
fective dimensions of experience that have usually been regarded as operative 
mostly in our experience, appreciation, and creation of various arts, but are now 
recognized as lying at the heart of all our meaning-making. (AMT: 51) 
I have no objection to the critique of traditional aesthetics as a philosophy 
of art that has segregated the aesthetic into a sphere that is as autono-
mous as irrelevant for what instead would be the “really meaningful” ex-
perience. Accordingly, I agree with Johnson that Dewey, and in particular 
his 1934 masterpiece Art as experience, can be a strategic reference 
point. Redeeming the aesthetic from its segregation, however, perhaps 
does not mean denying the possibility, and even the opportunity, that it 
still makes sense to speak of “aesthetic experience” as distinct, in some 
dimension (without reference to types or kinds), from something else 
that is, although not aesthetic, yet still experience. I do not believe, in-
deed, that it is legitimate to argue that every experience as such should 
be characterized as aesthetic. And I think that this can be supported pre-
cisely by remaining faithful to Dewey. 
With Dewey, if it is right to deny the existence of different types or 
kinds of experience, it seems wrong not to recognize the opportunity of 
describing it according to different dimensions. In the same way, it is by 
knowing the side of a square that we can determine both its surface area 
and its perimeter without both reducing one thing to the other and de-
fining different types or kinds to which the square would belong or, even 
less so, different ontological regions to which it would pertain. 
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Within experience in general Dewey distinguishes what he calls “an” 
experience, i.e. the experience whose peculiar character becomes a 
prominent aesthetic dimension (see Art as experience’s chapter 3). In 
other terms, according to Dewey not all experience is aesthetic. On the 
other hand, the spectrum of the dimensions of experience that Dewey 
illustrates in Experience and nature certainly cannot be reduced to the 
aesthetic. Aesthetic is (only) “an” experience (or rather: experience when 
it is “an” experience), not “the” experience. The latter is mere experience-
of something (when, for instance, a subject faces an opposed object for 
exclusively cognitive purposes), i.e. the generic interaction between or-
ganism and environment. However, it reveals its inhering in the aesthetic 
dimension (only) when it appears as an aspect of a field relationship that 
is specific (or specifically pregnant) because the terms between which it 
is established are also included. When I’m simply feeding myself, my ex-
perience is of the food; I face the food as a means of my nutrition. But 
when I’m having “an” experience such as a great meal in Paris, what 
counts is the experience I have with the food that is served to me, with 
the company I’m having dinner with, etc. Here the terms involved, “col-
luded”, are not opposed; they are not considered as facing each other, 
but as taking part in the course of the same interaction from which they 
emerge. Speaking of that meal in Paris as “an” experience, means that it 
is only within this experience that both I and the food are “defined” for 
what we “truly” are, that is, for the value we will have when we remember 
or tell someone about that meal. This shows how each experience-of is a 
(potentially) partial manifestation of “an” experience-with. It is thus still 
possible to discern between non-aesthetic experience and aesthetic ex-
perience, although not in terms of ontological regions but in terms of phe-
nomenological dimensions. 
2. This has directly to do with the relationship between experience and 
meaning, which similarly does not allow for a 0-1, off-on juxtaposition in 
Dewey’s theory. We could use also here the same scheme that emerged 
previously. According to the aesthetic dimension, expression is performa-
tively experience with meaning. When, on the other hand, this dimension 
is not pregnant, the relationship to meaning is that of the experience of 
it or, as Dewey says, that of assertion. 
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In other words: 
- In expression meaning is experience, it consists in its very unfolding, in 
its articulation for how it is structured and configured in its peculiarity (as 
“an” experience with the meaning that is engaging us); 
- In assertion meaning is (not absent, but) terminus ad quem to which the 
sign of the assertion points, as experience to which it simply refers (in the 
ongoing progress of “the” experience of the meanings we face). 
Expression as an experience with the meaning is the way how organ-
isms feel themselves invited to take part in a certain interaction field 
thanks to the material qualities provided by a medium (in the “material 
collusion” that the aesthetic engagement defined by Johnson in several 
pages as “visceral” consists of). Therefore, it marks off the aesthetic di-
mension of experience. And given this collusive-expressive character of 
the whole field involving the organism with his/her environment, a sort 
of aesthetic foundation for the conception of the “extended mind” sur-
faces, making the latter irreducible to the cognitive (as instead is the case 
in the discussion of the extended mind model in relation to aesthetics 
recently carried out by Nannicelli 2019). 
3. In this horizon, it is necessary to clarify in what sense a conception of 
the mind as embodied is able to really preserve also its own extended 
nature. Neglecting the latter could have consequences that risk deeply 
impacting on the way we consider the aesthetic in general.  
When we speak of an extended mind, the idea that a mind which is 
intracranial first and only then “gets extended” in order to include por-
tions of the outer world is misleading. Once again we could use Dewey 
and his conception of the verbal character of the mind to underline how 
the extended mind coincides with the very organism-environment inter-
action in its various modalities (as the manifold articulations of the verb 
“to mind” show). In this sense I would say that extended mind means first 
of all experience-with: it cannot be conceived not only beyond embodi-
ment (as Johnson points out; AMT: 55), but also regardless of its aesthetic 
connotation, i.e. its intrinsically immersive nature (on the link between 
aesthetic and immersive, AMT: 247-8), where however (and on this, per-
haps, I disagree with Johnson) the body in which it is embodied is not a 
subject, but a vector of the field itself. To speak of an extended mind 
therefore means at the same time to speak of an oxymoronically imper-
sonal (not yet felt as personal) lived-living body. It is the active threshold 
of a perceiving that becomes feeling and vice versa, of an osmotic border 
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on which something like a Self (a tendency towards the first person per-
spective) and something like a world (a tendency towards objectivity) 
emerges. Understood otherwise, that is, starting from the body in the first 
person, the idea of embodiment would only replicate, with respect to the 
body, the same dualistic patterns of the modern and Cartesian mind, with 
the further drawback of being less armed against a brutal reductionism 
(moving from a mind as an interaction to a mind as a mere neurological 
system). 
Thus, it is true that Johnson notes that “meaning arises in the pro-
cesses of organism-environment interaction that mutually define our-
selves and our world” (AMT: 14), or also that “subjectivity and objectivity 
are thus two aspects of one and the same experiential process” (AMT: 
204). However, in the description that he offers of this mutuality, the rad-
ical mediation that should precede the reality of a Self and of a world is 
instead expressed beginning from a Self (with its acquired contents, ei-
ther perceptually or imaginatively, that is, with respect to a past currently 
deemed reactivable or with respect to a future currently deemed predict-
able) and a world (with its objective properties given as affordances) (see, 
for instance, AMT: 14). 
This is also confirmed by Johnson’s non-critical reference to Barsalou 
and his “simulation semantics” theory (see also AMT: 246). It is no coin-
cidence that this account of nuclei of perceptual meaning is carried out 
according to the principle of “simulation”, as if – empiristically – the “real” 
perception were another matter entirely.  
This could be countered with a more markedly phenomenological in-
terpretation of the above mentioned radical mediation. The experiential 
content, especially on the perceptual and aesthetic level, is anything but 
simulated: it “enters the scene” in its full meaning. When we read a poem, 
we do not simulate events (as Johnson seems to suggest when he writes: 
“Our understanding of the poem operates partly through our sensory and 
motor simulation of the events presented therein”; AMT: 16). Properly, 
these events enter the scene (as, again, Johnson suggests when he rightly 
states: “That felt qualitative unity is not re-presented by the poem; ra-
ther, it is enacted in and realized through the continuous process of the 
unfolding of the poem”; AMT: 17). The term “simulation”, with the halo 
of denigration of appearance it bears, does not seem to me entirely com-
patible with this performative enactment which consists in the entering 
into the scene of an experiential arc which even the organism that partic-
ipates personally experiences with.  
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“Simulation” can apply in an empiricist perspective that emphasizes 
the ontological impoverishment, of true reality in the simulation: a simu-
lation can always be falsifying and fictitious and therefore it is intrinsically 
amendable. Instead, the overall aesthetic content of an experience is 
never, as such, amendable (at most, with the same vectors involved in an 
experiential arc one can always have a new experience, and not amend 
the previous one). 
The question can also be addressed with respect to ordinary experi-
ence. As far as Johnson’s observations on the “meaning of a bowl” (AMT: 
244-5) are concerned, the thesis that it “is not just some abstract concept 
specifying a defining set of features that jointly constitute it as a bowl” 
(AMT: 244) is certainly to be supported. What I find problematic, how-
ever, is his further description, that seems to place the meaning exceed-
ing any abstract definition in the set of perceptual or imaginative experi-
ences that have been acquired previously with respect to the object (see 
also AMT: 210 and 244 ff.). This description can at most corroborate a 
regressive analysis of meaning, which however does not explain either its 
emergence or the capacity of the generation of a “new” meaning, which 
by definition is such because it manifests itself without any previous ac-
quisition. 
The point is that everything we are willing to call a “bowl” shares not 
objective traits or personal lived experiences, but the fact that it popu-
lates a field in which the experience with something unfolds itself in the 
same way (the way in which materials, even liquid ones, are contained 
and made transportable, for instance: a “bowl-lish” field, so to speak, 
which requires those who act personally to manage it accordingly, i.e. re-
sponding to the expressive appeal they feel drawn by), regardless of 
whatever we experience (whether it be artifacts made of ceramic or other 
materials, or even our own bowl-shaped hands). In short, aesthetics is, 
prior to being the experience of the possible (see AMT: 248), an experi-
ence with possibility. 
And it is to this “how” that the various perceptual or imaginative ac-
quisitions also hold on in the course of our lives. Indeed, it constitutes the 
radically extra-linguistic component of meaning on which Johnson him-
self insists several times (see for instance, directly linked to the aesthetic, 
AMT: 209 ff., and especially 211-2) (without, however, clarifying in what 
terms this is compatible with the regressive vision mentioned above). In-
deed, the “how” is what language stages with words, and which thus al-
ways exceeds the propositional order of the latter, as much as any other 
given set of signs. And in order to capture this “how” one must rather 
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insist on the relational dimension of experience outside of any ontological 
hypothesis about what is in an experience, whatever side (subjective or 
objective) one wants to consider. 
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Tone Roald (University of Copenhagen) 
The primacy of the aesthetic. A discussion on Professor Mark Johnson’s 
book The aesthetics of meaning and thought 
Return to me often and take me, 
beloved sensation, return to me and take me –  
when the body’s memory awakens, 
and old desire seeps again into the blood; 
when the lips and the skin remember, 
and the hands feel as if touching anew. 
 
Return to me often and take me in the night, 
when the lips and the skin remember. (Kavafis 1912) 
Konstantinos Kavafis’ poem, Return to me, is a celebration of the body’s 
potential to create meaning in sensing. The artistically rendered meaning 
reveals the significance of the sensuous body, a field of deep experience. 
What Aristotle wrote more than two thousand years ago in Physics reso-
nates with Kavafis’ poem: “Art1 completes what nature cannot bring to a 
finish. The artist gives us knowledge of nature’s unrealized ends”. Nature 
 
1 Aristotle used the Greek word techné which translates not only to “art”, but also 
“craft”.  
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realized anew: this Kavafis achieves through an intensification of mean-
ing. Implicit in Aristotle’s statement, and exemplified by Kavafis, is that 
art can complete or give form to experience, and at its root lies the body 
and its ways of being in the world. Art is an exemplary form for expressing 
intensified meaning, and all meaningful experiences are aesthetic. This is 
the crux of Professor Johnson’s The aesthetics of meaning and thought 
(2018 [= AMT]). He shows that aesthetics is the foundation experience 
and that meaning is rooted in our bodily ways of being in the world. 
Meaning is experienced through sensed “patterns, images, concepts, 
qualities, emotions and feelings” (AMT: 2), which are the origin for both 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity – in other words, the foundation of all 
experience. Aesthetics is that which reveals meaning, a meaning that is 
first and foremost bodily and sensate, but at the same time the bedrock 
of law, morality, philosophy, thought, and reason. Because of this bodily 
continuity in meaning, experience should not be distinguished as differ-
ent kinds or varieties. Experiences are alike in their bodily foundation. 
They are more similar than they are different, as all experience is inti-
mately connected. 
Aristotle argued that thoughts and feelings are connected. Both take 
part in forming an experiential whole; they are mutually constitutive. So 
too argues Johnson, through a reading of John Dewey, among others. But 
even if some of these thoughts have been known for a long time, Profes-
sor Johnson’s work is revolutionary. He blends these ancient insights with 
cognitive science and neuroscience and (humorously) shows us a way to-
ward philosophical and scientific progress. The value of his scholarship 
cannot be overestimated. As one of the most important philosophers of 
our time, Johnson, in collaboration with George Lakoff in their seminal 
work on metaphors, has fundamentally altered the way we understand 
the relationship between our bodily experiences and language. In the cur-
rent collection of essays, Johnson expands on this earlier work by showing 
how meaningful experience is aesthetic. His far-reaching claim is that “it 
is ultimately the aesthetic dimensions of experience that underlie and 
make possible philosophy and all other modes of thinking” (AMT: 200).  
Aesthetics has for centuries been viewed as subordinate to logic and 
epistemology – a common prejudice since Kant, whose project of critique, 
Johnson points out, granted aesthetics a particular epistemic function. 
One of the results was that feelings were viewed as a result of, not the 
basis for, judgement (of beauty on art and nature). Feelings were “sec-
ondary” (AMT: 9). Johnson turns such reasoning on its head, showing that 
what was regarded as superior is in fact dependent upon what was 
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regarded as inferior for its existence – reason is dependent upon the aes-
thetic dimension, and with it, feelings. Johnson does so in a balanced way, 
as reason and logic are certainly important for democracy, morality, eth-
ics, etc. He dissolves the rigid boundaries between the various fields and 
the various aspects of subjectivity by focusing on their common ground. 
This is a particularly important focus given how powerful a grip the natu-
ral sciences have on research, where the importance of theory and qual-
itative research is generally downplayed. Particularly in this context, John-
son’s contributions continue to be revolutionary. One could say that prag-
matism has been cutting-edge for a long time, its full impact yet to be 
experienced. One of the ways this impact is to be experienced is through 
focusing on the more anti-reductionistic questions regarding how experi-
ence – and, with it, activity, affectivity, and meaning – develops. By an-
swering some of the big (or hard) conundrums of philosophy, Johnsons 
provides us with an answer to the question: How does the aesthetic pro-
vide the foundation for meaning and thought?  
Aesthetics comes from the Greek word “aisthesis” and Aristotle used 
it to refer to sense experience. Dorthe Jørgensen, in her comprehensive 
work on the history of aesthetic ideas (see for instance Jørgensen 2003), 
divides the history of aesthetics into two broad streams: one concerned 
with processes of sensing, the other with art. Johnson is concerned with 
both and shows how they are continuous with each other. Aesthetics, 
Johnson argues, is about how we acquire meaning in a world of sensing 
that forms understanding: “All meaningful experience is aesthetic experi-
ence” (AMT: 2). This is a profoundly powerful statement. It does not mean 
that all experiences are aesthetic, as meaningful experience is endowed 
with a “unifying, qualitative whole” (AMT: 214)2. This was, Johnson 
stresses, Dewey’s grand idea for aesthetics. Not all experience, he contin-
ues, has this characteristic, as most of the time experience is fragmented 
and not well defined – “slack”, in other words. But when experience is 
meaningful, it has the characteristic of being unified. Art, Johnson argues, 
is the epitome of such experience, because art has a unique capacity to 
express meaning that cannot be adequately captured by formal language. 
 
2 This is an important distinction today as there is a tendency to see all experience as 
sense experience, that is, meaningful experience. Within the enactivist tradition, 
sense-making is meaning-making, and when conscious, we are in a continuous process 
of sensing. The differentiation of experience into “unifying qualitative wholes” reveals 
that some experiences stand out in contrast to others. Not all experiences are mean-
ingful. 
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Art is the consequence of intense activity manifesting “depth, intensity, 
focus” (AMT: 210); a rich variety of meaning related to the everyday. 
When art is meaningful it is because it relates to common experience. 
Therefore, to single out aesthetic experience as unique experience is 
about the worst you can do, according to Johnson: “One of the biggest 
errors we can make in aesthetic theory is the fetishizing of ‘the aesthetic’, 
as if only certain very special kinds of experience are aesthetic. That road 
wrongly leads to the separation of art from life (as if ordinary living was 
not an aesthetic undertaking), and robs us of the means to explain the 
power of artworks to matter to us and to change us” (AMT: 240). What 
concerns me, however, is whether such a claim leads us to ignore im-
portant qualitative differences between art and other forms of activities, 
e.g. crafts. When artists give form to their work, this is (most of the time) 
a daunting, all-encompassing task. For example, psychologist Bjarne Sode 
Funch has shown in Funch (1997) how the artist often gives form to emo-
tional life. When we experience these works, they give form to our emo-
tions. We know from qualitative research that experiences with art can 
make your life meaningful in a new way. From a psychological point of 
view, it is unproblematic to state that aesthetic experience can be special, 
yet related to the everyday. Certainly, there is common ground to be 
found between meaning-making (Johnson’s aesthetic dimension) and art, 
but there are important qualitative differences too. I will not attempt to 
give a definition of art, but one characteristic is that it reveals new expres-
sion (and thereby new meaning). Without recognizing some special char-
acteristics of art, are we not in danger of reducing the rich variety of 
meaning and experience? This risk is exemplified by Dewey, who even 
regarded “habits as art” (AMT: 37). What we regard as art is certainly not 
a unitary phenomenon; it is also, as Johnson stresses, steeped in morality, 
economics, and politics. But is it not, nevertheless, characterized by ra-
ther unique objects that may lead to qualitatively unique experiences? 
The question then becomes: How can we maintain continuity without 
losing sight of difference? An answer can be found in Professor Johnsons 
own work. Transferring his thoughts on the concept of “property” to “aes-
thetics” means that aesthetics is not characterized by necessary and suf-
ficient features: “Instead the concept is a vast radially structured category 
with a small number of central members or prototypical cases sur-
rounded at various distances by noncentral members, according to prin-
ciples of extension such as conceptual metaphor and metonymy” (AMT: 
195). In this way, experiences can be related, yet qualitatively different. 
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Experiences with art can resemble other experiences, yet endow us with 
unique possibilities for affective meaning. 
This reduction of difference in regards to art may resemble a reduc-
tion of difference with regard to subjectivity where “pragmatism denies 
mind/body dualism” (AMT: 45). Johnson also refers to a “non-dualist con-
ception of experience” (e.g. AMT: 108). Since Descartes, this has been a 
necessary and important challenge, but the phenomenological fact re-
mains that not all experience is expressed, and there is an experiential 
difference – or a duality – represented in the metaphors “inner” and 
“outer”. In other words, there is a necessary distinction revealed in “in-
ner” and “outer”, and also in “body” and “mind”. We know today that the 
“inner” is constitutively dependent upon the “outer”, and that the body 
gives form to thought and has its own “tacit cogito” (see Merleau-Ponty 
1945). How can we avoid the radical duality of Descartes and maintain a 
continuity between “inner” and “outer” without losing sight of their dif-
ference? 
One of Professor Johnson’s solutions or goals is for cognitive science 
to adapt to the insights of pragmatism. Succeeding in this would indeed 
be a small revolution. Although he argues for a plurality of approaches 
and methods for science and philosophy (AMT: 112-3), he also claims that 
“cognitive neuroscience is now (and will remain into the distant future) 
the principle mode of insight into mind, thought, language, and values” 
(AMT: 114). Johnson enters into dialogue with second-generation cogni-
tive neuroscience, which takes seriously the bodily aspects of thought, 
meaning, and reason. I would like to question whether this tradition, 
nonetheless, necessarily should be supplemented and challenged by the 
rich insights of phenomenological, psychodynamic, and cultural-historical 
analyses of subjectivity, which take seriously the flux and flow of “inner” 
and “outer”. Cognitive neuroscience is certainly dominant in academia 
today, but is it not, for instance, dependent on phenomenology to pro-
vide a clarification of the nature of the phenomena in question? 
Continuing this line of thought, with reference to William James’s no-
tions of “thought-feeling” and “feeling of thinking” (AMT: 105), Johnson 
argues that emotions and feelings are essential to all experience: “Emo-
tions lie at the heart of our ability to grasp the meaning of any situation 
in which we find ourselves” (AMT: 20), and emotion is “at the heart of 
cognitive processes” (AMT: 21). In other words, he does not give priority 
to cognition as compared to affect. The priority of reason or cognition 
over affect is a remnant of the Enlightenment. Since Johnson has shown 
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us that language and metaphors matter, how should we rethink and re-
name cognitive science? 
These are only minor contentions or points for discussion, for at the 
heart of all these approaches and at the depth of all experience lies bod-
ily, sensuous, and thereby aesthetic understanding, which reveals itself in 
language through metaphor. Professor Johnson has provided us with in-
sight into the basis of all experience, which unites us beyond our philo-
sophical, psychological, and scientific differences. 
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Mark Johnson  
Responses 
I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to my commentators, for their 
willingness to read Aesthetics of meaning and thought and then provide 
constructive critical observations on my general philosophical orienta-
tion. I greatly appreciate their commitment of considerable time and en-
ergy, and their insightful comments have helped me better understand 
and articulate my own perspective. When astute readers raise concerns 
about something you’ve said, this can provide a much-needed occasion 
for recognizing lack of clarity in expression, confusion about one’s own 
view, or downright error. 
In courses I teach on the philosophy of John Dewey, I often begin with 
the warning that Dewey takes virtually every philosophical term (e.g., ex-
perience, nature, art, mind, thought, knowing, feeling, value) and reinter-
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prets that term in the context of a radically non-dualistic and process-
oriented account of mind, thought, and language. Consequently, terms 
like “experience” and “aesthetics” are used in ways that challenge our 
commonsense conceptions, and even mainstream philosophical concep-
tions. In my work, a primary example of this reinterpretation is my claim 
that “all meaningful experience is aesthetic experience” (Johnson 2018 [= 
AMT: 2]). Giovanni Matteucci is concerned that, in recognizing the central 
role of aesthetic elements in everyday experience, I may have failed to 
appreciate the possibility and importance of a distinctly “aesthetic expe-
rience”. Thus, he suggests that “it still makes sense to speak of ‘aesthetic 
experience’ as distinct, in some dimension (without reference to types or 
kinds), from something else that is, although not aesthetic, yet still expe-
rience” (AMT: x). He concludes, “I do not believe, indeed, that it is legiti-
mate to argue that every experience as such should be characterized as 
aesthetic”. 
Professor Matteucci and I are in general agreement, along Deweyan 
lines, that not everything we experience has an aesthetic character. The 
point here, as Tone Roald observes, is that much of what we call experi-
ence is slack, incoherent, underdeveloped, and not particularly meaning-
ful. This so-called experience has to be distinguished from what happens 
when the materials and processes of life achieve a meaningful organiza-
tion that marks that experience off from the more mundane lackluster 
occurrences that make up our ordinary undergoings and doings. Dewey 
called such an event “an experience”, to indicate its consummatory char-
acter. So, when, at the beginning of the book, I said that I would be argu-
ing that “all meaningful experience is aesthetic experience”, the word 
“meaningful” is crucial, insofar as it indicates an experience. We call an 
experience “aesthetic” and we call certain objects “art” to mark them as 
exemplary instances where meanings are especially harmonized, intensi-
fied, and enriched. They reveal possible meanings of an object or event. 
These are not distinct “types” of experience, but rather represent a con-
tinuum of experiences ranging from barely coherent mundane happen-
ings all the way up to celebrated enactments of meaning in the arts and 
sciences. So, I suspect that Professor Matteucci actually agrees that none 
of this requires the postulation of distinct types of experiences having 
unique ontological or epistemological characteristics, even though we 
can still speak of “aesthetic” experiences of enriched and heightened 
meaning that play a special role in our lives. 
However, I take issue with Professor Matteucci’s interpretation of my 
position on two important points. The first is his claim that, in emphasiz-
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ing the primordial role of organism-environment interactions, I may have 
turned the “self” into an object and thereby simply reinforced the Carte-
sian mind-body dualism I am claiming to overthrow. He says “the radical 
mediation that should precede the reality of a Self and of a world is in-
stead expressed [by Johnson] beginning from a Self (with its acquired con-
tents, either perceptually or imaginatively, that is, with respect to a past 
currently deemed reactivable or with respect to a future currently 
deemed predictable) and a world (with its objective properties given as 
affordances)”. Against this reading, I would simply point out that through-
out the book I have argued that self and world are emergent patterns of 
experience, and not separate or separable entities of any sort. What we 
call the self is, indeed, an intermingling of habits of perception, thought, 
feeling, and responsive action, but it is never a static object, nor merely 
the sum of past experiences, insofar as it is always moving toward possi-
bilities for future experiences.  
Regarding this issue of the nature of selfhood, Professor Matteucci 
warns that the term “simulation semantics” might tend to reinforce the 
mistaken notion that there is a pre-given, fixed self that simulates ob-
served perceptions and actions. To counteract this reading, I have inter-
preted simulation, not as copying, but instead as activating some of the 
same sensory, motor, and affective processes in reading or hearing a de-
scription of some experience as would operate in actually having that ex-
perience. Professor Matteucci correctly notes my insistence that poems 
and other artworks do not re-present pre-existing meanings, but rather 
enact possibilities of meaningful experience in a continuously unfolding 
process. He then asks whether this enactive view is best captured by the 
term “simulation”, a term that “does not seem to me entirely compatible 
with this performative enactment”. I agree with this important point. Let 
me therefore say that the “simulation semantics” of which I spoke, is not 
that of a fixed, pre-existing, self that then represents perceptions and ac-
tions; rather, it is an enactive growth of a self-in-process as it encounters 
the meaningful affordances available in its present context. I suspect that 
Professor Matteucci and I agree that what I’m calling simulation is an ac-
tive, constituting, and ever-developing process through which the self is 
continuously re-made. 
The second significant point of disagreement stems from Professor 
Matteucci’s insistence that my account of meaning-making is based solely 
on past experiences, and does not embrace the enactment of new possi-
bilities for meaning and value. If this were true, it would be a most non-
Deweyan and woefully inadequate account of experience. He says, “what 
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I find problematic, however, is his further description, that seems to place 
the meaning exceeding any abstract definition in the set of perceptual or 
imaginative experiences that have been acquired previously with respect 
to the object” [italics added]. He calls this a “regressive analysis of mean-
ing”. To the contrary, I had hoped it was evident that the meaning of a 
situation is just as much a matter of the possibilities for future meaningful 
experiences it affords, as it is a matter of past sedimented experiences. 
One of my recurrent mantras about the temporality of processes of 
meaning is that the meaning of an object or event is the experiences 
(past, present, and future) it affords a creature of a certain physical make-
up, interacting with its social others, and projecting into possibilities for 
future experiences. So, I trust it is clear that, far from being a merely re-
gressive (past oriented) process, human meaning-making is equally pro-
gressive, reaching out toward the future possibilities it can envision and 
enact. Art, I have claimed, is an exemplary instance of this temporal pro-
cess of expanding and deepening meaning. 
Tone Roald appreciates my expanded conception of aesthetics as per-
taining to all dimensions of meaningful experience. Her opening para-
graph is a clear, concise, and incisive summary of the structure of my ar-
gument: “He shows that aesthetics is the foundation of meaningful expe-
rience and that meaning is rooted in our bodily ways of being in the world. 
Meaning is experienced through sense ‘patterns, images, concepts, qual-
ities, emotions and feelings’, which are the foundation for both subjectiv-
ity and intersubjectivity – in other words, the foundation of all experi-
ence. Aesthetics is that which reveals meaning, a meaning that is first and 
foremost bodily and sensate, but at the same time the foundation of law, 
morality, philosophy, thought, and reason”. Tracing key implications of 
this embodied aesthetics, Professor Roald anticipates my response to 
Professor Matteucci’s concern about over-generalizing the scope of the 
aesthetic. She observes that my central claim that all meaningful experi-
ence is aesthetic experience “does not mean that all experiences are aes-
thetic, as meaningful experience is endowed with a ‘unifying, qualitative 
whole’. [...] [M]ost of the time experience is fragmented and not well de-
fined – ‘slack’, in other words. But when experience is meaningful, it has 
the characteristic of being unified [...] and art is the epitome of such ex-
perience, because art has a unique capacity to express meaning that can-
not be adequately captured by formal language”. 
Professor Roald is a world expert on the phenomenology of aesthetic 
experience, so her major concern with my view is whether it can do jus-
tice to those events in experience that we tend to mark off as especially 
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aesthetic. “What concerns me” she says, “is whether such a claim (that 
all meaningful experience is aesthetic experience) leads us to ignore im-
portant qualitative differences between art and other forms of activities, 
e.g., crafts. [...] When we experience these works, they give form to our 
emotions. We know from qualitative research that experiences with art 
can make your life meaningful in a new way” [parentheses added]. With 
this point, I completely agree. However, following Dewey, I am regarding 
the aesthetic dimensions of meaningful experience as forming a continu-
ity that runs from “an experience” in daily life (i.e., one that is qualitatively 
unified and stands out as meaningful) up to those works of art that we 
value for their rich enactment of emotions, values, and possibilities for 
meaningful experience. So, I agree with Professor Roald that there is val-
ue in studying how we experience what we call “works of art” and height-
ened “aesthetic experiences”, just as long as we do not hypostatize such 
experiences into unique, discrete kinds. The phenomenological analyses 
she and her colleagues in Copenhagen are developing have an important 
role to play in gaining a deeper understanding of the pervasive workings 
of aesthetic dimensions in all aspects of our lives. 
This brings us to an important methodological point. I have touted the 
importance of recent “second-generation” cognitive science in helping us 
understand the workings of aesthetics in meaningful experience. One 
reason for emphasizing the contributions of what I call embodied cogni-
tive science is that the vast majority of our cognitive and affective pro-
cesses operate unconsciously, and are not directly available to conscious 
introspection. Therefore, we need to employ all of the empirical methods 
of inquiry available to us, if we hope to understand the breadth and 
depths of human experience. We cannot rely only on introspective reflec-
tions. That said, there is nonetheless a significant role for just the kind of 
phenomenological analyses Professor Roald and her co-workers are ex-
ploring. I am suggesting that phenomenological reflection can provide 
only part of an adequate account, and it must be integrated with other 
empirical approaches from the various mind sciences that allow us to 
probe unconscious processes. Therefore, when Professor Roald ends by 
asking “whether this tradition (of second-generation [embodied] cogni-
tive science), nonetheless, necessarily should be supplemented and chal-
lenged by the rich insights of phenomenological, psychodynamic, and cul-
tural-historical analyses of subjectivity” I respond with a resounding 
“Yes!” [parenthesis added]. 
The need for a suitably rich and non-reductive phenomenology of aes-
thetic dimensions of experience is beautifully elaborated by Hallgjerd 
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Aksnes, a professor of musicology at the University of Oslo. Over the past 
two decades, she has explored what it means to have an embodied aes-
thetics – an aesthetics rooted in our sensory, motor, and affective en-
gagement with our world. This entails that aesthetics cannot be, in its first 
instance, an intellectual conceptual enterprise. Instead, it must focus pri-
marily on the perceptual, qualitative, emotional, feeling-based, and ac-
tion-oriented dimensions of meaning. Consequently, Professor Aksnes 
drives home the necessity of starting with a phenomenological account 
of musical phenomena that is descriptively rich and nuanced, and thereby 
that has at least some chance of capturing the aesthetic workings of mu-
sical meaning, which can be gestured at, but never completely described 
in language. For, without a rich and thick description of musical experience, 
we would have no idea how to employ embodied cognitive science for the 
elucidation of musical processes. You have to circumscribe and describe 
musical events and experiences before you can explain how they work. 
Musical experience is an enactment of qualities and emotional (and 
feeling) contours in a process of metaphorical musical motion. Therefore, 
a perceptive musical phenomenology can reconnect us to the power of 
the music to move us in our very core. So, picking up on my brief attempt 
to describe some of our experience as we see and hear Gene Kelly’s fa-
mous Singin’ in the rain, Professor Aksnes adds to and enriches my de-
scription, as indicative of what an embodied aesthetics would involve, 
and why it matters. In so doing, by further extending and deepening my 
account, she shows how an aesthetics of embodied meaning should pro-
ceed. Contrary to traditional aesthetic theory, we do not need an episte-
mology attempting to explain how music can achieve vaunted cognitive 
status; instead, we need an account of the simulative affective enactment 
of some of the musical forces, qualities, and contours of motion that 
make music so powerful and captivating for us. Why is it that most of us 
would trade a thousand philosophical or psychological essays on the pain 
of lost love, for one playing of the Beatles’ Yesterday? It is because the 
Beatles enact the full felt sense of loss and anguish through the resources 
of musical timbre, melodic line, harmonies, and tempo. As Professor Ak-
snes illustrates, an embodied aesthetics has to immerse us in these enac-
tive processes as best we can through the limited resources of conceptual 
language. In her own research on musical therapy, Professor Aksnes ar-
gues “that so-called receptive music therapy (i.e. music therapy that takes 
music listening as its point of departure) is not at all passively receptive, 
[...] but rather ‘actively acting’ (‘aktivt handlende’), as we say in Norwe-
gian – or enactive”. 
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As a wonderful example of this power of music, Aksnes points to our 
musical outbursts in a time of global pandemic crisis: “Musical joy, like a 
smiling face, happy voice, and silly swooshing splash, is contagious – even 
more contagious than the Coronavirus! That is why people are rushing to 
their balconies all over the world to play with, and for, each other these 
days: to share empathetic humanity and contagious musical joy during 
the Coronavirus crisis”. As proof of the power of embodied aesthetic ex-
perience, one is almost tempted to add QED (i.e., that which was to be 
proved) after these sentences. 
I very much appreciate Professor Aksnes’ insight that an aesthetics of 
the sort we are exploring here is itself an art. She points out that our phe-
nomenological descriptions, when done well, are themselves poetry – not 
formal conceptual analyses, but artistic enactments of meaning. What 
better example could there be of how aesthetic considerations operate 
pervasively and profoundly at all levels of our experience, understanding, 
and reasoning, which is one of the central claims of my book. 
The cultural realization of such an aesthetic undertaking provides an 
appropriate segue into Tom Alexander’s account of the cultural forms of 
meaning and symbolic interaction that develop in and through our body-
based processes of meaning-making. Projects like mine, that focus mostly 
on the emergence of meaning in our sensory, motor, and affective pro-
cesses, sometimes have a tendency to over-emphasize the embodied ba-
ses for meaning and thought, while not giving sufficient attention to the 
social and cultural dimensions of experience and cognition. In response, I 
have tried, over the past fifteen years (and especially in The Meaning of 
the Body), to be more attentive to the social construction of systems of 
meaning and value. Professor Alexander’s rich accounts of cultural mean-
ings, in his lovely book The human eros: eco-ontology and the aesthetics 
of existence, provides a ground-map for exploring our definitive human 
need for meaning and value, as realized in our socio-cultural practices and 
institutions. In his commentary on my book, therefore, he focuses on how 
we can move from what might appear to be individual psychological pro-
cesses and operations to large-scale cultural meanings and values. 
I began my academic career working on the central role of conceptual 
metaphor in all aspects of conceptualization and reasoning, and so Alex-
ander begins by observing how these systematic conventionalized meta-
phors are, in fact, repositories of shared cultural values and meanings that 
constitute habits that shape the way we experience, understand, think, 
and act. Alexander has a deep appreciation of the central role of imagi-
nation in human understanding and thought. He explains this new con-
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ception of imagination as an expansive transformative process: “Imagina-
tion is the way human beings mean, the way we engage a qualitative, 
moving world in terms of its possibilities, as process, not a completed sys-
tem of facts”. These cultural enactments of meaning are rooted in bodily-
based image schemas that provide structure and direction for our devel-
oping processes of thinking and judging. The qualitative and imaginative 
dimensions of experience and understanding root our thinking and acting 
in our embodied, visceral engagement with our surroundings. There thus 
develops a continuity between our sensory and motor interface with our 
environment and our “higher” processes of meaning-making, conceptu-
alization, and reasoning. All of these processes are aesthetic. “Aesthetics”, 
Alexander concludes, “is no longer a neglected corner of the project of epis-
temology, concerned with a special ‘attitude’ or limited to the themes of 
art and beauty and how judgments about them are possible. It now has 
central import as dealing with the creation of meaning and value in human 
existence” – processes that are at once embodied and socially shared. 
Professor Alexander coined the term “the human eros” to indicate our 
human drive to experience meaning, value, and enhanced quality of life. 
We have both suggested that this erotic quest for meaning is a fundamen-
tally aesthetic process that makes living a good life a profoundly artistic un-
dertaking. Alexander summarizes: “The human eros seeks to create and 
sustain spiritual ecologies, cultural worlds within which we can encounter 
meanings and values and have a sense of who we are. All sorts of cultural 
practices and objects contain core cultural meanings that help refresh and 
strengthen the central tropes that define a group or an individual”.  
Finally, just one further observation following on the heels of Profes-
sor Alexander’s cultural analysis. The aesthetics of meaning and thought 
is part of my attempt to show that aesthetics is the operative process un-
derlying all forms of experience, understanding, and action. Because the 
commentators’ remarks are appearing in a journal of aesthetics, it is not 
surprising that their focus would center on works of art as exemplary of 
human meaning-making. However, if I am even roughly correct in seeing 
aesthetic dimensions everywhere in human cognitive activity, I would sug-
gest that we need to explore the workings of these dimensions in areas 
traditionally regarded as exclusively cognitive and rational domains, such 
as science, philosophy, law, morality, and virtually any theoretical enter-
prise. That is why the bulk of the book is about just these practices and 
institutions, with their embodied aesthetic origins. 
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